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Abstract
We consider the regret matching process with ﬁnite memory. For general
games in normal form, it is shown that any recurrent class of the dynamics
must be such that the action proﬁles that appear in it constitute a closed set
under the “same or better reply” correspondence (CUSOBR set) that does not
contain a smaller product set that is closed under “same or better replies,” i.e.,
a smaller PCUSOBR set. Two characterizations of the recurrent classes are
oﬀered. First, for the class of weakly acyclic games under better replies, each
recurrent class is monomorphic and corresponds to each pure Nash equilibrium.
Second, for a modiﬁed process with random sampling, if the sample size is
suﬃciently small with respect to the memory bound, the recurrent classes
consist of action proﬁles that are minimal PCUSOBR sets. Our results are
used in a robust example that shows that the limiting empirical distribution
of play can be arbitrarily far from correlated equilibria for any large but ﬁnite
choice of the memory bound.
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1 Introduction
We consider the regret matching process based on ﬁnite memory. Each player re-
members the last m action proﬁles used in the game. Regret is calculated with
respect to the average payoﬀ obtained in those m periods. With respect to the last
action chosen, the player calculates his or her regret from not having used other
actions, when those actions replace the last action each time it was used in the m
periods that the player recalls. The player switches with positive probability to those
actions associated with positive regret, but continues to play the same action also
with positive probability. This process corresponds exactly to the regret matching
of Hart and Mas-Colell (2000), except that our players’ memory is not unbounded.
A typical state of the m-period memory regret learning process is a list of m
action proﬁles. It is shown that any recurrent class of the dynamics must be such
that the action proﬁles that appear in it constitute a closed set under the “same
or better reply” correspondence (CUSOBR set) that does not contain a smaller
product set that is closed under “same or better replies,” i.e., a smaller PCUSOBR
set. Since this is only a necessary condition, in general games we are not able to oﬀer
a characterization of the recurrent classes of the m-period memory regret learning
process. However, we oﬀer two possible ways out that yield a characterization. First,
for the class of weakly acyclic games under better replies, each recurrent class is
monomorphic and corresponds to each pure Nash equilibrium of the game. Second,
for a modiﬁed process in which agents sample at random from their bounded memory,
if the sample size is suﬃciently small with respect to the memory bound, the recurrent
classes consist of action proﬁles that are minimal PCUSOBR sets.
Our ﬁndings turn out to shed interesting new light on the results in Hart and
Mas-Colell (2000). These authors prove that the empirical distribution of play of
their unbounded-memory regret matching process converges almost surely to the set
of correlated equilibrium distributions. But as Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) them-
selves point out, little more is known about additional convergence properties of
the empirical play distribution. In contrast, our analysis oﬀers clear pointwise con-
vergence conclusions. In weakly acyclic games, per period play in our process will
almost surely in ﬁnite time be a pure Nash equilibrium that will be played for ever
into the future. In terms of the empirical distribution of play, given the random-
ness in choosing the arbitrary initial conditions, we know that it is a correlated
equilibrium in the convex hull of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In general, for
any game, pointwise convergence of per period play can only happen to pure Nash
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equilibria. But in addition, we know that play in ﬁnite time will enter one of the
CUSOBR sets of the game not containing a smaller PCUSOBR set. This in turn
implies that the empirical distribution converges to a point, which lies in the convex
hull of distributions whose supports are CUSOBR sets that do not contain smaller
PCUSOBR sets. As it turns out, this may give a long-run prediction far from the
set of correlated equilibria, in the following sense. We oﬀer a robust example, in
which there is a unique correlated equilibrium distribution, and such that for any
ﬁnite m –the memory bound– the limiting empirical play distribution concentrates
with probability arbitrarily close to 1 on an action proﬁle that is not in the support
of the correlated equilibrium. The main result in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) seems
to depend crucially on the unbounded memory assumption.
1.1 Related Literature
Our process is part of the no-regret learning literature (e.g., Hannan (1957), Fuden-
berg and Levine (1995), Foster and Vohra (1998), Hart and Mas-Colell (2000)).1 In
related processes, Young (1993) shows that if players have bounded recall and play a
myopic best reply to a sample drawn from their memory, where the sample is suﬃ-
ciently small compared to the memory, then in games that are weakly acyclic (under
“single best reply”), per period play converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.2 Young
(1998) proves that this learning dynamics converges to a minimal curb –closed under
rational behavior– set for generic ﬁnite N -player games. In Hurkens (1995), players
have bounded recall of m periods and play myopic best replies to their beliefs, where
the belief of player i about player j is any distribution with its support in the set of
actions played by player j during the last m periods. It is shown that this learning
dynamics converges to a minimal curb set in all ﬁnite N -player games. Instead of
myopic best reply, players in Josephson and Matros (2004) use an imitation dynam-
ics. That is, players have bounded recall, and out of her memory, each player samples
all past actions and the corresponding payoﬀs. She then plays the action that had
the highest average payoﬀ in her sample. The recurrent classes of this dynamics in
all ﬁnite N -player games are monomorphic states and the main result is that the set
of stochastically stable monomorphic states is a union of sets that are minimal closed
sets under single better replies. Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) prove that the face of
a product set (set of all mixed strategies with support in the set) is asymptotically
1See Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Hart (2005), Young (2004) or Sandholm (2009) for surveys
of learning and related areas.
2“Single” means that only one player is allowed to change his or her action at a time.
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stable under any sign-preserving selection dynamics (in continuous time) if and only
if the set is closed under better replies. Each such set always contains an essential
component of Nash equilibria that is strategically stable.
Young (2004) considers a better reply process with ﬁnite memory and inertia, in
which each player repeats her last action with an exogenous probability, and with the
rest of the probability, she chooses an action according to some distribution over the
set of actions with positive unconditional regret over the ﬁnite number of periods she
remembers. He proves that this process converges in per-period play to a pure Nash
equilibrium in games that are weakly cyclic under single better replies.3 Marden
et al (2007) study a regret based dynamics with fading –instead of ﬁnite– memory
and inertia. That is, with a positive probability each player repeats her last period’s
action and with the rest of the probability she updates her action as a function of her
unconditional regrets where past regrets are exponentially discounted. Their result
is that if players use this learning rule, then in games that are weakly acyclic under
single better replies and in which no player is indiﬀerent between distinct strategies,
per period play converges to pure Nash equilibrium almost surely.
In Zapechelnyuk (2008), an agent is playing against nature. The agent has recall
m and her adaptive behavior is a function of her unconditional regrets over the last
m periods. He assumes that the agent plays according to a better-reply rule, which
is deﬁned by the following weak requirement: whenever there exists an action with
positive unconditional regret, the agent does not play any action with non-positive
unconditional regrets. Unconditional regret matching of Hart and Mas-Colell (2000)
is a particular better-reply rule. He provides a 2 × 3 game example, where the
agent is the row player and nature is the column player. He assumes that nature
plays according to ﬁctitious play with recall m, i.e., in every period, it plays a best
reply to the agent’s average play over the last m periods. Under this assumption,
he proves that for any better-reply rule and for any large enough recall m, there
exists an initial history and period T such that for all t ≥ T , the probability that the
agent’s maximum unconditional regret over the last m periods is bounded away from
0 is bounded below by a positive constant. That is, any better-reply rule of the agent
with large enough bounded recall is not universally consistent with nature’s strategy.
Apart from adaptive play being a function of unconditional regrets, the diﬀerence
with respect to our example below is that nature’s adaptive behavior (although a
3This class of games is smaller than the class of games that are weakly acyclic under better
replies. See Saran and Serrano (2010), where we study regret matching with one-period memory
under ﬁxed and random matching, for a detailed comparison.
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better-reply rule) is not the same as the agent’s. In related work to Zapechelnyuk’s,
Lehrer and Solan (2009) ﬁnd an adaptive rule with bounded recall that converges to
the set of correlated equilibria by “restarting the memory.”
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes regret matching
with ﬁnite memory. Section 3 deﬁnes CUSOBR and PCUSOBR sets. We provide
the results in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the connections with Hart and
Mas-Colell (2000). Finally, Section 6 collects the proofs.
2 Regret Matching with Finite Memory
Consider a N -person game in normal form G, with a ﬁnite set of actions Ai for each
player i ∈ N . Call A = ∏i∈N Ai. Let πi(ai, a−i) be her payoﬀ when she chooses ai
and the other players choose a−i.
Suppose that the players remember the last m ≥ 1 action proﬁles. At the be-
ginning of period t + 1, let (at−m+1, . . . , at) be the history of action proﬁles played
during the last m periods. Player i’s average payoﬀ over these m periods is given by
Πi =
1
m
t∑
k=t−m+1
πi(a
k). Let ati be the action played by player i in period t. For all
a′i = ati, let Πi(a′i) be the average payoﬀ over the last m periods that player i would
have obtained had she played action a′i every time she played action a
t
i during the
last m periods. That is, Πi(a
′
i) =
1
m
t∑
k=t−m+1
υki (a
′
i), where
υki (a
′
i) =
{
πi(a
′
i, a
k
−i) if a
k
i = a
t
i
πi(a
k
i , a
k
−i) if a
k
i = ati.
(1)
Deﬁne Ri(a
′
i) = Πi(a
′
i)−Πi. Then, player i switches to action a′i in period t+1 with
probability q(Ri(a
′
i)) > 0 if and only if Ri(a
′
i) > 0, whereas she does not switch with
the rest of probability, which we assume is positive, i.e.,
∑
a′i =ati
q(Ri(a
′
i)) < 1.
4 This
adaptive behavior is regret matching a` la Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) but with ﬁnite
recall.
4 Several diﬀerent speciﬁcations of q(·) are possible. For instance, let A∗ be the maximum number
of actions that any player has and Δ∗ = maxi
(
max(ai,a−i)
(
maxa′i πi(a
′
i, a−i)−πi(ai, a−i)
))
. Then
any q(·) such that q(x) ∈ [0, 1A∗Δ∗ ) and q(x) > 0 ⇐⇒ x > 0 will fulﬁll these properties. In our
analysis, we ﬁx q(·) to be one such function.
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Deﬁne a state of the matched players in a period to be the history of last m action
proﬁles. Hence, the set of states is H = Am.
Given G, for ﬁxed q(·), regret matching with bounded recall describes an aperiodic
Markov process M¯G(q) on the state space H. We identify its recurrent classes next.
A recurrent class is a set of states such that if the process reaches one of them, it
will never leave the set, and such that it does not admit a proper subset of states
with the same property.
3 CUSOBR and PCUSOBR Sets
For any (ai, a−i) ∈ A, the set of same-or-better replies for player i is
Ri(ai, a−i) = {a′i ∈ Ai|either a′i = ai or πi(a′i, a−i) > πi(ai, a−i)}.
Let RG : A → A be the same-or-better-reply correspondence of the game G, i.e.,
RG(a1, . . . , aN) =
∏
i∈N
Ri(ai, a−i).
Deﬁnition 3.1. A set of action proﬁles Aˆ ⊆ A in G is closed under same-or-better
replies (CUSOBR set) if for all (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ Aˆ, we have RG(a1, . . . , aN) ⊆ Aˆ. A
minimal CUSOBR set is a CUSOBR set that does not contain a proper subset that
is a CUSOBR set.5
For any nonempty Aˆ ⊆ A, deﬁne
R˜G(Aˆ) =
⋃
(a1,...,aN )∈Aˆ
(∏
i∈N
Ri(ai, a−i)
)
.
Equivalently, Aˆ is a CUSOBR set if and only if Aˆ is a ﬁxed point of R˜G, i.e., R˜G(Aˆ) =
Aˆ.
It is easy to see that (a1, . . . , aN) is a pure Nash equilibrium of G if and only
if {(a1, . . . , aN)} is a singleton minimal CUSOBR set. Furthermore, since G has a
ﬁnite number of action proﬁles, there exists a minimal CUSOBR set.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Aˆ ⊆ A is a product set of action proﬁles that is closed under same-
or-better replies (PCUSOBR set) if Aˆ is a product set and for all (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ Aˆ,
5See Saran and Serrano (2010) for a comparison of CUSOBR sets with other set-valued concepts.
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L R
U 1, 0 0, 0
M 0, 1 2, 0
D 2, 0 0, 1
(a)
L C R
Uˆ 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1
U 1, 0 0,−1 0, 0
M 0, 1 2, 0 0, 0
D 2, 0 0, 1 0, 0
(b)
Figure 1
we have RG(a1, . . . , aN) ⊆ Aˆ. A minimal PCUSOBR set is a PCUSOBR set that
does not contain a proper subset that is a PCUSOBR set.
For any nonempty Aˆ ⊆ A, deﬁne
RˆG(Aˆ) =
∏
i∈N
⎛
⎝ ⋃
(ai,a−i)∈Aˆ
Ri(ai, a−i)
⎞
⎠ .
Note that a product set Aˆ is a PCUSOBR set if and only if Aˆ is a ﬁxed point of RˆG,
i.e., RˆG(Aˆ) = Aˆ.
Remark: Every minimal CUSOBR set that is a product set is a minimal PCUSOBR
set. Thus, in particular, a pure Nash equilibrium is both a singleton minimal CU-
SOBR set and a singleton minimal PCUSOBR set. Moreover, every minimal PCU-
SOBR set contains a minimal CUSOBR set. Hence, the set of minimal CUSOBR
sets and minimal PCUSOBR sets coincide in games where all minimal CUSOBR sets
are product sets. However, in some games, the set of minimal CUSOBR sets is a
reﬁnement of the set of minimal PCUSOBR sets. Game (a) in Figure 1 has a unique
minimal CUSOBR set {(U,L), (M,L), (M,R), (D,L), (D,R)}, which is a reﬁnement
of its unique minimal PCUSOBR set {(U,L), (U,R), (M,L), (M,R), (D,L), (D,R)}.
On the other hand, it is also possible that there exists a minimal CUSOBR set that
is not a subset of any minimal PCUSOBR set of the game. For example, Game (b)
in Figure 1 has a unique minimal PCUSOBR set {(Uˆ , R)} but it has two minimal
CUSOBR sets, {(Uˆ , R)} and {(U,L), (M,L), (M,C), (D,L), (D,C)}.
4 Results
For any set of states Hˆ ⊆ H, let A(Hˆ) ⊆ A be the set of all action proﬁles that are
played in some state in Hˆ.
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Proposition 4.1. (a) If Aˆ is a minimal PCUSOBR set of G, then there exists a
recurrent class Hˆ of M¯G(q) such that A(Hˆ) ⊆ Aˆ.
(b) Hˆ is a recurrent class of M¯G(q) only if A(Hˆ) is a CUSOBR set of G that does
not contain a smaller PCUSOBR set.
Remark: Due to inertia in the dynamics, for any (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ A(Hˆ), there exists a
monomorphic state (a1, . . . , am) ∈ Hˆ such that ak = (a1, . . . , aN) for all k = 1, . . . ,m.
Hence, if Hˆ and Hˆ ′ are two recurrent classes of M¯G(q), then A(Hˆ)
⋂
A(Hˆ ′) = ∅.
A stronger result can be established if G is weakly acyclic under better replies.
A better-reply graph is deﬁned as follows: each action proﬁle of G is a vertex of the
graph and there exists a directed edge from vertex (a1, . . . , aN) to vertex (a
′
1, . . . , a
′
N)
if and only if (a1, . . . , aN) = (a′1, . . . , a′N) and (a′1, . . . , a′N) ∈ RG(a1, . . . , aN). A
sink is a vertex with no outgoing edges. A better-reply path is a sequence of ver-
tices (a11, . . . , a
1
N), . . . , (a
L
1 , . . . , a
L
N) such that there exists a directed edge from each
(al1, . . . , a
l
N) to (a
l+1
1 , . . . , a
l+1
N ). The game G is weakly acyclic under better replies if
from any action proﬁle, there exists at least one better-reply path to a sink. Clearly,
an action proﬁle is a sink if and only if it is a pure Nash equilibrium of G. Thus, the
game G is weakly acyclic under better replies if from any action proﬁle there exists
at least one better-reply path to a pure Nash equilibrium.
If G is weakly acyclic under better replies, then every CUSOBR set contains a
pure Nash equilibrium, which is a singleton PCUSOBR set. Hence, we obtain the
following corollary:
Corollary 4.2. Suppose G is weakly acyclic under better replies. Then, Hˆ is a
recurrent class of M¯G(q) if and only if A(Hˆ) is a pure Nash equilibrium of G.
We are, however, not able to strengthen Proposition 4.1 to an “if and only if”
statement for games that are not weakly acyclic under better replies, which is the
reason to turn to a random sampling version of the process next. That is, we thus
far have assumed that players consider all the past periods in the m-period history.
Instead, suppose that each player i independently draws a random sample of s periods
(a1, . . . , as) from the m-period history (at−m+1, . . . , at) and calculates her regrets
relative to the latest action in her sample, asi (unlike earlier, where the regrets are
calculated relative to the latest action ati).
Formally, let Πsi =
1
s
s∑
k=1
πi(a
k) be player i’s average payoﬀ over her s-period
sample. For all a′i = asi , let Πsi (a′i) be the average payoﬀ over these s periods that
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player i would have obtained had she played action a′i every time she played action
asi during these s periods. That is, Π
s
i (a
′
i) =
1
s
s∑
k=1
υki (a
′
i), where
υki (a
′
i) =
{
πi(a
′
i, a
k
−i) if a
k
i = a
s
i
πi(a
k
i , a
k
−i) if a
k
i = asi .
Deﬁne Rsi (a
′
i) = Π
s
i (a
′
i) − Πsi . Then, player i plays action a′i in period t + 1 with
probability q(Rsi (a
′
i)) > 0 if and only if R
s
i (a
′
i) > 0, whereas she does not switch with
probability 1 −∑a′i =asi q(Rsi (a′i)) > 0.6 This adaptive behavior is regret matching
with bounded recall and random sampling.
As before, a state of the matched players in a period is the history of last m
action proﬁles. Hence, the set of states is still H. Given G, for ﬁxed q(·), regret
matching with bounded recall and random sampling describes an aperiodic Markov
process M˜G(q) on the state space H.
Proposition 4.3. If s/m is suﬃciently small, then Hˆ is a recurrent class of M˜G(q)
if and only if A(Hˆ) is a minimal PCUSOBR set of G.
5 Connections with Hart and Mas-Colell’s Regret
Matching
Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) study the long-run behavior when the players use regret
matching but, in contrast to our model, have unbounded memory. Regret matching
with unbounded recall is deﬁned as follows: at the beginning of period t + 1, let
(a1, . . . , at) be the history of action proﬁles played. The average payoﬀ of player i
over this history is given by Πti =
1
t
t∑
k=1
πi(a
k). Let ati be the action played by player
i in period t. For all a′i = ati, let Πti(a′i) be the average payoﬀ that player i would
have obtained had she played action a′i every time she played action a
t
i in the history.
That is, Πti(a
′
i) =
1
t
t∑
k=1
υki (a
′
i), where υ
k
i (a
′
i) is as in (1). Deﬁne R
t
i(a
′
i) = Π
t
i(a
′
i)−Πti.
Then, player i switches to action a′i in period t + 1 with probability
1
c
max{Rti(a′i), 0},
6Again, several speciﬁcations of q(·) are possible. See Footnote 4.
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whereas she does not switch with probability
1− 1
c
∑
a′i =ati
max{Rti(a′i), 0},
which is positive for a suﬃciently large constant c.
Let μt be the empirical distribution of play up to period t, i.e., for every (a1, . . . , aN),
μt(a1, . . . , aN) =
1
t
|{1 ≤ k ≤ t|ak = (a1, . . . , aN)}|.
The main theorem in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) states the following: If the
players use regret matching with unbounded recall, then the empirical distribution
of play μt converges almost surely as t → ∞ to the set of correlated equilibrium
distributions of G. Nevertheless, as Hart and Mas-Colell (2000, p. 1132) themselves
point out, we know little about additional convergence properties of μt under regret
matching with unbounded recall. In particular, it is not known whether μt converges
to a “point”, i.e., a distribution over the set of action proﬁles. We know that if there
exists a ﬁnite time T such that for all t > T , μt lies in the set of correlated equilibria,
then μt must be a pure Nash equilibrium for all t > T (because the action proﬁle does
not change whenever μt is a correlated equilibrium as all regrets are zero). Hence,
if μt does not converge to a pure Nash equilibrium, then the sequence {μt}t≥1 must
lie inﬁnitely often outside the set of correlated equilibria. Therefore, if μt converges
to a point, then it can either converge to a pure Nash equilibrium or a correlated
equilibrium on the boundary of the set of correlated equilibria.
To facilitate the comparison with regret matching with bounded recall (but no
sampling), let’s ﬁx q(·) to be such that player i switches to action a′i in period
t+1 with probability 1
c
max{Ri(a′i), 0}, whereas she does not switch with probability
1 − 1
c
∑
a′i =ati
max{Ri(a′i), 0}, where c is suﬃciently large to ensure that the latter is
positive.
In contrast to Hart and Mas-Colell (2000), we have precise results about the
pointwise convergence of per period play under regret matching with bounded recall.
If G is weakly acyclic under better replies, Corollary 4.2 tells us that per period
play at will almost surely in ﬁnite time be a pure Nash equilibrium – the particular
equilibrium depends on the initial history. In this case, μt converges as t → ∞ to
a correlated equilibrium distribution that lies in the convex hull of the pure Nash
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equilibrium distributions.7
More generally, Proposition 4.1 tells us that under regret matching with bounded
recall, per period play at will almost surely in ﬁnite time enter some CUSOBR set
that does not contain a smaller PCUSOBR set – again, the particular set depends
on the initial history – and after that time, each of the action proﬁles that belong to
this set, and only this set, will be played inﬁnitely often. This in turn implies that μt
converges as t → ∞ to a point, which lies in the convex hull of distributions whose
supports are CUSOBR sets that do not contain smaller PCUSOBR sets. However, as
the following example illustrates, the empirical distribution of play need not converge
to the set of correlated equilibrium distributions when players have bounded recall.
Example 5.1. Suppose there are two players who repeatedly play the game in Figure
2, where  ≥ 0.
L C R
U 0, 20 50, 15 60, 20
D 10, 30 40, 35 60 + , 25
Figure 2
Fix m ≥ 1, and let M(m, ) be the transition matrix of the Markov process when
the players use regret matching with bounded recall of m. Let Mhh′(m, ) be the hh
′
entry in this matrix, i.e., the probability of transition from state h = (a1, . . . , am) to
state h′ = (a′1, . . . , a′m) in one period. Note that a′k = ak+1 for all k = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Let i and j denote, respectively, the row and column players. Since the players
choose their actions independently, Mhh′(m, ) = ihh′(m, )jhh′(m, ), where ihh′(m, )
and jhh′(m, ) are the probabilities that, respectively, the row player plays action
a′mi and the column player plays action a
′m
j during the next period conditional on
state h. Since Rj(·) does not depend on , jhh′(m, ) does not depend on . Thus,
jhh′(m, ) = jhh′(m, 0) for all . Similarly, if h is such that a
k
j = R for all k = 1, . . . ,m,
then ihh′(m, ) = ihh′(m, 0) for all . So suppose h is such that out of all the periods
in which player i played ami , player j played L and R in, respectively, l and r periods.
7This follows from the properties of the invariant distributions of the process. Since the recurrent
classes of the process coincide with monomorphic states that are pure Nash equilibria, any invariant
distribution of the process is a convex combination of the distributions whose supports are such
monomorphic states. A similar remark applies to the convergence of μt when the game is not
weakly acyclic under better replies.
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First, let ami = U . Then, conditional on state h, Ri(D) =
10
m
(2l + r −m) +  r
m
.
Therefore, if  < min{10
m
, c− 10} (note that c > 10 to ensure positive probability of
inertia in the process when  = 0), then the probability that the row player switches
to D the next period is
10
cm
(2l + r −m) +  r
cm
< 1, if 10
m
(2l + r −m) ≥ 0
0, if 10
m
(2l + r −m) < 0.
Hence, for all  < min{10
m
, c− 10}, we have:
• if a′mi = D, then
ihh′(m, ) =
{
ihh′(m, 0) + 
r
cm
< 1, if 10
m
(2l + r −m) ≥ 0
ihh′(m, 0), otherwise.
• if a′mi = U , then
ihh′(m, ) =
{
ihh′(m, 0)−  rcm > 0, if 10m (2l + r −m) ≥ 0
ihh′(m, 0), otherwise.
Next, let ami = D. Then, conditional on state h, Ri(U) =
10
m
(m − 2l − r) −  r
m
.
Therefore, if  < 10
m
and c > 10, then the probability that the row player switches to
U the next period is
10
cm
(m− 2l − r)−  r
cm
∈ (0, 1), if 10
m
(m− 2l − r) > 0
0, if 10
m
(m− 2l − r) ≤ 0.
Hence, for all  < 10
m
, we have:
• if a′mi = U , then
ihh′(m, ) =
{
ihh′(m, 0)−  rcm > 0, if 10m (m− 2l − r) > 0
ihh′(m, 0), otherwise.
• if a′mi = D, then
ihh′(m, ) =
{
ihh′(m, 0) + 
r
cm
< 1, if 10
m
(m− 2l − r) > 0
ihh′(m, 0), otherwise.
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Thus, whenever  < min{10
m
, c − 10}, there exists a Q(m) such that M(m, ) =
M(m, 0) + Q(m).
If  > 0, then the set of all action proﬁles is the game’s unique CUSOBR set that
does not contain a smaller PCUSOBR set. Hence, it follows from Proposition 4.1
that the Markov process deﬁned by M(m, ) has a unique recurrent class and hence,
a unique invariant distribution, μ(m, ). Then,
μ(m, ) = μ(m, )M(m, ) = μ(m, )M(m, 0) + μ(m, )Q(m).
There exists a subsequence where μ(m, ) converges pointwise to say μ(m) as  → 0.
Hence, along this subsequence, we have
μ(m) = lim
→0
μ(m, ) =
(
lim
→0
μ(m, )
)
M(m, 0) = μ(m)M(m, 0).
That is, μ(m) is an invariant distribution of the Markov process deﬁned by M(m, 0).
But if  = 0, then {(U,R)} is the game’s unique CUSOBR set that does not contain
a smaller PCUSOBR set; the only other CUSOBR sets are the set A and the set
A \ {(D,R)}. Therefore, the Markov process deﬁned by M(m, 0) has a unique
invariant distribution, with support on the monomorphic state in which (U,R) is
played. Hence, we conclude that for any memory m, there exists an m > 0 such
that the unique invariant distribution of the Markov process deﬁned by M(m, m)
puts probability close to 1 on the monomorphic state in which (U,R) is played.
For any  > 0, the game has a unique correlated equilibrium, in which each of
the action proﬁles (U,L), (U,C), (D,L) and (D,C) has probability equal to 0.25.
Thus, ﬁxing a ﬁnite m as large as one wishes, we have argued that there exists an
 small enough such that the empirical distribution of play of the game as t → ∞
is concentrated on the outcome (U,R) a proportion of time close to 1: this is very
“far” from the unique correlated equilibrium distribution of the game.
On the other hand, for any  > 0 and taking m = ∞, it follows from the result
in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) that the limiting empirical distribution of play must
approximate the unique correlated equilibrium. Our analysis shows that, in obtaining
this result, the inﬁnite tail of memory is crucial.
6 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Suppose Aˆ is a PCUSOBR set. Let Pi(Aˆ) be the pro-
jection of Aˆ on Ai. Pick any action proﬁle (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ Aˆ. Suppose that in period
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t, the dynamics is in state (at−m+1, . . . , at) ∈ H such that ak = (a1, . . . , aN),∀k =
t − m + 1, . . . , t. We argue by induction that for all t′ ≥ t, the state in period
t′, (at
′−m+1, . . . , at
′
) is such that ak ∈ Aˆ,∀k = t′ − m + 1, . . . , t′. This is clearly
true for t′ = t. Now, suppose this is true for t′′ ≥ t. Consider at′′+1. It must be
that for all i, either at
′′+1
i = a
t′′
i or there exists a a
k, where t′′ − m + 1 ≤ k ≤ t′′,
such that aki = a
t′′
i and πi(a
t′′+1
i , a
k
−i) > πi(a
k
i , a
k
−i). If a
t′′+1
i = a
t′′
i , then obviously
at
′′+1
i ∈ Pi(Aˆ). On the other hand, since ak ∈ Aˆ (follows from the induction hypoth-
esis) and Aˆ is a PCUSOBR set, we again have at
′′+1
i ∈ Pi(Aˆ). Since this is true for
all i, at
′′+1 ∈ ∏i∈N Pi(Aˆ) = Aˆ, where the equality follows since Aˆ is a product set,
which completes the induction argument.
This implies that starting from period t, any action proﬁle that does not belong
to Aˆ is played with zero probability. Hence, there exists a recurrent class Hˆ such
that A(Hˆ) ⊆ Aˆ. The ﬁrst statement in the proposition follows from this fact.
Next, suppose Hˆ is a recurrent class of M¯G(q). We ﬁrst argue that A(Hˆ)
is a CUSOBR set. Pick any action proﬁle (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ A(Hˆ). There exists a
(a1, . . . , am) ∈ Hˆ such that ak = (a1, . . . , aN),∀k = 1, . . . ,m (because there is iner-
tia in the dynamics and Hˆ is a recurrent class). Let (a′1, . . . , a
′
N) ∈ RG(a1, . . . , aN).
From state (a1, . . . , am), there is a positive probability that the dynamics will move to
the new state (a2, . . . , am, am+1), where am+1 = (a′1, . . . , a
′
N). Since Hˆ is a recurrent
class, it must be that (a2, . . . , am, am+1) ∈ Hˆ and hence, (a′1, . . . , a′N) ∈ A(Hˆ).
Now, suppose A(Hˆ) is a CUSOBR set that contains a smaller PCUSOBR set Aˆ.
Then there exists a recurrent class of M¯G(q), H ′ such that A(H ′) ⊆ Aˆ ⊂ A(Hˆ),
a contradiction. This completes the proof of the second statement in the proposi-
tion.
Proof of Proposition 4.3: As in the previous proof, we can argue that if Aˆ is a
PCUSOBR set, then there exists a recurrent class Hˆ of M˜G(q) such that A(Hˆ) ⊆ Aˆ.
We argue that if Hˆ is a recurrent class of M˜G(q), then A(Hˆ) contains a PCU-
SOBR set. Pick any action proﬁle (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ A(Hˆ). Recall the deﬁnition of RˆG
and to simplify notation, we instead write Rˆ. Consider the iteration
Rˆ({(a1, . . . , aN)}) ⊆ Rˆ2({(a1, . . . , aN)}) ⊆ . . . ⊆ Rˆl({(a1, . . . , aN)}) . . .
Since the set of action proﬁles is ﬁnite, there exists a ﬁnite l′ such that for all l ≥ l′,
Rˆl({(a1, . . . , aN)}) = Rˆl+1({(a1, . . . , aN)}) = A˜. By construction, A˜ is a PCUSOBR
set.
14
Let s|A| < m. Since Hˆ is a recurrent class, starting at any state in Hˆ, the
action proﬁle (a1, . . . , aN) will be played after ﬁnite time. Then each player can
repeatedly draw a sample in which as = (a1, . . . , aN) and therefore, this action
proﬁle will be played for the next m periods due to inertia, i.e., there exists a
(a1, . . . , am) ∈ Hˆ such that ak = (a1, . . . , aN),∀k = 1, . . . ,m. Let (a′1, . . . , a′N) ∈
Rˆ({(a1, . . . , aN)})\{(a1, . . . , aN)}. Starting with state (a1, . . . , am) in period t, there
is a positive probability that (a′1, . . . , a
′
N) is played for the next s periods. This is
because in each t + k period, where 1 ≤ k ≤ s, each player can draw a s-period
sample in which only (a1, . . . , aN) is played. Let (a
′′
1, . . . , a
′′
N) ∈ Rˆ({(a1, . . . , aN)}) \
{(a1, . . . , aN), (a′1, . . . , a′N)}. Starting with period t+s, there is a positive probability
that (a′′1, . . . , a
′′
N) is played for the next s periods. This is because in each t + s + k
period, where 1 ≤ k ≤ s, each player can again draw a s-period sample in which
only (a1, . . . , aN) is played. It is clear that in ﬁnite time, we will obtain a history h
in which each action proﬁle in Rˆ({(a1, . . . , aN)} is played for at least s periods. Let
(a˜1, . . . , a˜N) ∈ Rˆ2({(a1, . . . , aN)}) \ Rˆ({(a1, . . . , aN)}). Hence, for all i, there exists
a (a˜′i, a˜
′
−i) ∈ Rˆ({(a1, . . . , aN)}) such that a˜i ∈ Ri(a˜′i, a˜′−i). In each of the s periods
following history h, there is a positive probability that player i will draw a s-period
sample in which only (a˜′i, a˜
′
−i) is played. Hence, there is a positive probability that
(a˜1, . . . , a˜N) will be played during these s periods. Continuing the argument, we see
that we will obtain a history h˜ in which all action proﬁles in A˜ are played at least s
times. Since Hˆ is a recurrent class, history h˜ ∈ Hˆ. Hence, A˜ ⊆ A(Hˆ).
So far we have argued that: (i) if Aˆ is a PCUSOBR set, then there exists a
recurrent class Hˆ such that A(Hˆ) ⊆ Aˆ, and (ii) if Hˆ is a recurrent class, then
A(Hˆ) contains a PCUSOBR set. It follows from these statements that a minimal
PCUSOBR set Aˆ contains a A(Hˆ), where Hˆ is a recurrent class, which in turn
contains a PCUSOBR set A˜. Since Aˆ is a minimal PCUSOBR set, it must be that
Aˆ = A(Hˆ). On the other hand, if Hˆ is a recurrent class, then A(Hˆ) contains a
PCUSOBR set and hence a minimal PCUSOBR set A˜, which in turn contains a
A(H˜), where H˜ is a recurrent class. But H˜ = Hˆ and hence, A(Hˆ) = A˜. Thus, the
proposition is established.
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